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ORGANIZED CRIME: CHALLENGE TO THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
Part III-Legal Antidotes for the Political Corruption Induced by Organized Crime
EARL JOHNSON, JR.
Mr. Johnson is a Special Attorney in the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the United
States Department of Justice.* After receiving his J.D. degree from the University of Chicago Law
School in 1960, Mr. Johnson became a Ford Foundation Fellow in Criminal Law at the North-
western University School of Law, where he received his LL.M. degree in 1961.
This article is the last of three installments. The first appeared in Volume 53, Number 4 of the
Journal, at page 399, and the second in Volume 54, Number 1, at page 1. This series of articles is
based upon a thesis which the author prepared while a graduate student at the Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law.
Mr. Johnson's first installment contained an assessment of the effects of organized crime on
American society and an analysis of the factors which have made organized crime difficult to suppress
through traditional methods of law enforcement. The second installment summarized the various
legal countermeasures available to an honest prosecutor-particularly a local prosecutor-in com-
bating organized crime. These measures involve techniques designed to weaken criminal organi-
zations through convicting their leaders, reducing their profits, and denying them access to services
and facilities necessary to their illegal enterprises. The third installment presents a survey of the legal
countermeasures available to minimize the effects of political corruption upon the prosecutive effort
against organized crime. This survey encompasses means for substituting another prosecutive agency
where the local prosecutor is corrupt or ineffectual, sanctions to discourage a corrupt official from
improper acts, methods of minimizing the effects of improper acts when they do occur, and techniques
to maximize the effect of an honest official where others in the law enforcement machinery appear to
be under the control of organized crime.-EDoOR.
Political corruption is not primarily a legal
problem. It is, quite logically, a political problem.
The cure for corruption, if such exists, is essentially
a political cure. Usually, a reform party, or a
reform element within an existing party, must
seize control of the government through the ex-
pensive, exhausting process of nominating and
electing uncorrupted and uncorruptible men to
substantially all the important offices. These men,
in turn, must fire the corrupted and not hire the
corruptible. This is a large order, and it is not the
purpose of this section to attempt to outline the
legal techniques, if any there are, for facilitating
this type of political movement. Instead, corrup-
tion will be assumed, and we will be concerned with
the legal ways and means of minimizing the
* The views expressed in this article are the views of
the author and are not meant to reflect those of the
United States Department of Justice or the Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section of that Department.
deliterious effects of corruption on the law en-
forcement effort against organized crime.
This installment will not consider methods of
removing the shield of corruption, but rather
techniques for penetrating or circumventing it.
Four approaches will be discussed, all of which
rest upon one large but relatively safe assump-
tion-that organized crime is never able simul-
taneously to obtain influence over all men at all
levels of government which have law enforcement
powers that can be employed against organized
crime. The four approaches are the employment of:
(1) techniques for initiating legal action against
organized crime despite corruption in the official or
officials exercising primary discretionary control
over the decision to prosecute; (2) techniques for
discouraging officials from behaving improperly;
(3) techniques for minimizing the effects of im-
proper official behavior when it does occur; and
(4) techniques for maximizing the results an honest
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element within the government can achieve de-
spite the presence of corrupt officials.
I. TECHNIQUES FOR INITIATING LEGAL ACTION
AGAINST ORGANIZED CRI=fi DESPITE CORRUPTION
IN OFFICIALS PRIMARmsy RESPONSIBLE
In most states the local prosecutor, whether
titled District Attorney, County Attorney, or
State's Attorney, is the man responsible for the
decision to prosecute or not to prosecute criminal
activity occurring within the jurisdiction. The
grant of discretion is broad.310 The local prose-
cutor's decision ordinarily is not reviewable ju-
dicially.311 Nor is it subject to formal adminis-
trative correction. If the local prosecutor refuses
to prosecute a criminal organization or its enter-
prises, it and they are virtually impregnable.
Moreover, the influence of the prosecutor's office
generally extends into the investigative agencies
as well, determining what character of cases is to
be accorded close scrutiny and what is to be passed
over lightly or ignored. Nevertheless, certain tech-
niques are available for bringing about action
against a criminal organization even though the
organization has been able to induce a voluntary
paralysis in the local prosecutor's office. Four
techniques to be discussed in this installment, all
calling for the substitution of some other person
or persons to carry out the prosecutor's function of
preparing and trying cases, are as follows: (a) sub-
stitution of a court-appointed special prosecutor;
(b) substitution of the state attorney general;
(c) substitution of private persons; (d) substitution
of the federal government.
A. Substitution of Court Appointed Special Prose-
cutor
When the local prosecutor, through allegiance
to a criminal organization or otherwise, refuses to
initiate prosecutive action, a limited number of
states authorize the court to appoint a special
prosecutor to carry on this function. It is almost
universal that some provision is made for the
appointment of a special prosecutor where the
regular prosecutor is unable to perform his duties
because of illness, absence, or interest;312 it is
310 See Baker, The Prosecuior-Iniliation of Prosecu-
tion, 23 J. CInI. L. & C. 770 (1933).
311 See, e.g., United States v. Brokow, 60 F. Supp.
100 (S.D. I1. 1945); State ex. rd. Spencer v. Criminal
Court, 214 Ind. 551, 15 N.E.2d 1020 (1938). Contra,
Ex parte Hyter, 16 Cal. App. 211, 116 Pac. 370 (1911).
312 See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. §7612 (1949); FLA.
relatively uncommon where the cause of the
prosecutor's inaction is ununllinguess rather than
inability to prosecute.313 Typical of the inability
statues is the New York law:
"Whenever the district attorney of any county
and his assistant, if he has one, shall not be in
attendance at a term of any court of record,
which he is by law required to attend, or is
disqualified from acting in a particular case to
discharge his duties at any such term, the court
may, by an order entered in its minutes, appoint
some attorney at law residing in the county, to
act as special district attorney during the
absence, inability or disqualification of the dis-
trict attorney and his assistant; but such ap-
pointment shall not be made for a period beyond
the adjournment of the term at which made.
The special district attorney so appointed shall
possess the powers and discharge the duties of
the district attorney during the period for which
he shall be appointed .... 314
Although the enumerated grounds for replacing
the regular prosecutor in this and similar statutes
do not embrace his refusal to prosecute, courts in
a few states have articulated a theory which
allows a judge to appoint a replacement prosecutor
in this situation.31 5 In Florida, for instance, trial
courts are considered to possess an inherent right,
independent of statute, to appoint a substitute
prosecutor where a State Attorney present and
able to prosecute refuses to perform this duty.30
STAT. ANN. §27.16; ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 14, §6 (1960);
MCKINNEY'S CONSOL. LAWS, N. Y. COUNTY LAW
§701; VA. CODE ANN. §19-4 (1959).
313 In many states attempts to utilize this type of
statute to replace a reluctant prosecutor have been
rebuffed by the courts. See, e.g., Mahaffey v. Territory,
11 Okla. 213, 66 Pac. 342 (1901); State v. Heaton, 21
Wash. 59, 56 Pac. 843 (1899). Contra, Spaulding v.
State, 81 Neb. 89, 85 N.W. 80 (1901).314 McKINNEY's CONSOL. LAWS, N. Y. COUNTY
LAWS, §701.
315 Territory v. Harding, 6 Mont. 323, 12 Pac. 750
(1887); Tesh v. Commonvealth, 34 Ky. (4 Dana) 522(1836). Other cases recognizing such an inherent right
of courts include Taylor v. State, 49 Fla. 69, 38 So. 380(1905); Wilson v. County of Marshall, 257 Ill. App.
220 (1930); Dukes v. State, 11 Ind. 556 (1858); State
v. Jones, 305 Mo. 437, 268 S.W. 83 (1924); State ex. rel.
Thomas v. Henderson, 123 Ohio St. 474, 175 N.E. 865(1931); Nance v. State, 41 Okla. Crim. 379, 273 Pac.
369 (1929); State v. Gauthier, 113 Ore. 297, 231 Pac.
141 (1924).
310 Taylor v. State, 49 Fla. 69, 38 So. 380 (1905).
The relevant Florida statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. §27.16,
allows for the substitution of a court-appointed special
prosecutor only for the inability of the regular prose-
cutor to perform his duties. However, in Taylor, it was
held that the inherent power of the court extends be-
yond the grounds enumerated in the statute to en-
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In addition to the jurisdictions in which courts
have an inherent power to appoint a special
prosecutor to act in place of a reluctant regular
prosecuting official, a few others have enacted
broad statutes which delegate specific authority to
their judges to call in replacements for prosecutors
who fail to act.317 However, of these relatively few
states which allow the court to appoint a special
prosecutor for refusal to prosecute, only a small
proportion permits citizens to petition the court to
make such an appointment,318 and none allows
appeal of a judge's refusal to appoint a special
prosecutor.3 19
As a technique for circumventing a corrupt local
prosecutor, substitution of a special prosecutor has
much to recommend it. If there is one honest,
fearless judge in the jurisdiction who is aware, or
is made aware, of a consistent failure to prosecute
organized crime for its criminal activities, there is
a good chance that a special prosecutor can be
obtained and legal action initiated. To be truly
effective, this special prosecutor should have the
power to go before a grand jury to procure an
indictment as well as to proceed under an existing
indictment. Assistants and investigators should be
made available if necessary. Furthermore, pro-
vision should be made for appointment of a special
prosecutor at the instance of a judge acting sun
sponte or upon petition of a private citizen, and a
decision denying such a petition should be review-
able by higher courts.
One of the major problems forseeable in having
a special prosecutor appointed by the court is the
tendency this procedure has of transforming the
court from an impartial judge to active partici-
pant.32o This difficulty, however, should be of
compass any failure of the regular prosecutor to carry
out his primary responsibilities.
317 Among those statutes authorizing substitution of
a special prosecutor on the express grounds that the
regular prosecutor has refused to act are ALA. CODE,
tit. 13, §235 (1956); N.M. STAT. Am. §§5-3-4, 5-3-30
(1953); N.D. REv. CODE §11-1606 (1957); Oto REv.
CODE 309.05 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 16, §7710(1960); TENN. CONST., art. 6, §5; UTAH CONST., art.
8, §10.
318 People v. Northrup, 184 Ill. App. 638 (1914);
Lake County Property Owner's Ass'n v. Holovachka,
233 Ind. 509, 120 N.E.2d 263, 121 N.E.2d 721 (1954).
319 Lake County Property Owner's Ass'n v. Holo-
vachka, supra note 318.
20 "Another problem involved in obtaining the
appointment of a special prosecutor is the tendency of
the court to construe their replacement power, whether
statutory or inherent, very narrowly. Perhaps one
reason for this limitation is the attitude of certain
judges that active participation in suppressing or-
ganized crime would destroy their usefulness as im-
minimal concern in a multi-judge judicial system,
where the prosecutor can be appointed by one
judge and the case tried before another.
B. Substitution of State Attorney General
Just as the substitution of a court-appointed
special prosecutor can be a valuable device where
honesty and fearlessness prevail in at least a part
of the local judiciary, similarly, the substitution of
the state attorney general is useful when he pos-
sesses those traits. Three different theories on
which intervention by the state attorney general
can be premised are found embodied in the statutes
of various states. Some states have supervisio321
statutes which usually are construed to permit a
state attorney general to conduct local prosecutions
in the name of supervising the performance of the
local prosecutor.m Supersessio statutes, the sec-
ond type, specifically provide for substitution by
the attorney general.m However, these statutes
vary as to who may request such intervention.
Some provide for action only at the instance of the
governor or legislature;m others permit inter-
vention by the attorney general at his own dis-
cretion.2 5 The third category of statutes grants
the attorney general concurrent jurisdiction in
criminal proceedings.321 This jurisdiction can nor-
mally be exercised either independently or jointly
with the local prosecutor.m
The laws of three states, Illinois, Florida, and
partial judges." Note, Legal Methods for the Suppres-
sion of Organized Crime: Circumventing the Corrupt
Prosecutor, 48 J. C=nr. L., C. & P.S. 531, 540 (1958).
32 See, e.g., Axsz. Rv. STAT. §41-193(4) (West
1956); MIcH. STAT. Aim. §183 (1952); WASH. REV.
CODE §43.10.090 (1951).
2 Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444, 185 N.W.
877 (1921); State ex rel. Nolan v. District Court, 22
Mont. 25, 55 Pac. 961 (1899); State ex rel. Miller v.
District Court, 19 N.D. 819 (1910). Contra, CONN.
GEN. STAT. §212 (1949).
323 See, e.g., MIcH. STAT. ANN. §3.181 (1952), Mc-
KINNEY'S CONSOL. LAWS, N.Y. ExEcuTivE LAW
§63(2); Omo REv. CODE §109.02 (1953).
121 See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. 84-205(9) (1943); WASH.
RaV. CODE 43.10.090 (1951).
325 See, e.g., IowA CODE Am. §13.2(2) (1949); NEv.
Coin. LAWS §7316(c) (1929); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§5-3-3 (1953).
328 See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ch. 20, §89 (1954); ORE.
R a. STAT. §180.240 (1955); VT. REv. STAT. §463(1947). It should be noted that some states, e.g.,
Nebraska, have provisions at one place or another in
their statutes authorizing all forms of replacement of
the local prosecutor, supervision, supercession, and
concurrent jurisdiction.
= "He [the attorney general] can initiate an action
independently of the local prosecutor or appear jointly
in the same proceeding with the local prosecutor."
Note, supra note 320, at 535.
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New York, where prime bastians of organized
crime are located, illustrate the variety of pro-
cedures and powers which have been made avail-
able to supersede local prosecutors who refuse to
carry out their sworn duties or who are inadequate
to the task. Illinois possesses the least adequate
law, providing only that when in the judgment of
the attorney general "the interest of the people of
the state requires it, he shall attend the trial of
any party accused of crime, and assist in the
prosecution."as It has been implied, however, that
even under this diluted authority the Attorney
General could institute and conduct proceedings if
it could be proved that a local prosecutor had
refused after being requested to act in a specific
situation.39 The relevant Florida statute embodies
a slightly different approach. Instead of substi-
tuting the state attorney general for a reluctant
local prosecutor, the Governor is authorized to
assign a local prosecutor from another area of the
state to conduct the prosecution of any case in
which the "ends of justice" would be served
thereby.330 In New York, two procedures are
available. For any cause sufficient to himself, the
Governor can direct the Attorney General's office
to handle a trial or grand jury proceeding."' In
3
2
8 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 14, §4.
32 In People v. Flynn, 375 Ill. 366, 31 N.E.2d 591
(1941), the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
Attorney General did not have authority under Illinois
law to conduct an independent grand jury probe into
the activities of a corrupt mayor who was permitting
gambling, prostitution, and other organization rackets
to operate unhindered. However, the court did empha-
size that this power was unavailable to the state At-
torney General only because the local prosecutor had
not refused to conduct such a probe himself.
310 "If any state attorney shall be disqualified to
represent the state in any case pending in the circuit
court of his circuit, or if for any reason the governor of
the state thinks that the ends of justice would be best
subserved by any exchange of state attorneys, the
governor may require an exchange of circuits or of
courts, in any of the counties of this state between such
state attorney and any other state attorney of the state,
or may assign any state attorney of the state to the
discharge of the duties of state attorney in any circuit
of the state, at any regular or special term of the circuit
court." FLA. STAT. ANN. §27.14.
131 "The attorney-general shall:
2. "Whenever required by the governor, attend in
person, or by one of his deputies, any term of the su-
preme court or appear before the grand jury thereof
for the purpose of managing and conducting in such
court or before such jury criminal actions or proceed-
ings as shall be specified in such requirement; in which
case the attorney-general or his deputy so attending
shall exercise all the powers and perform all the duties
in respect of such actions or proceedings, which the
district attorney would otherwise be authorized or re-
quired to exercise or perform; and in any of such actions
or proceedings the district attorney shall only exercise
the conduct of such proceedings the Attorney
General or his assistants enjoy the same powers
and responsibilities as the District Attorney would
in a like matter. Pursuant to a separate provision,
the Attorney General, with the approval or at the
direction of the Governor, can initiate an inde-
pendent investigation into "matters concerning
the public peace, public safety and public jus-
tice." 33 For purposes of conducting this investi-
gation he is extended broad-ranging powers in-
cluding the authority to employ necessary
temporary assistance, investigators, and clerical
personnel. It has been specifically held that the
relationship between organized crime and politics
constitutes a matter "concerning the public peace,
public safety and public justice."m
such powers and perform such duties as are required of
him by the attorney-general or the deputy attorney-
general so attending. In all such cases all expenses in-
curred by the attorney-general including the salary or
other compensation of all deputies employed, shall be a
county charge." McKINMnY's CONSOL. LAWS, N.Y.
ExEcuTrvw LAW §63.
m "Whenever in his judgment the public interest
requires it, the attorney-general may, with the ap-
proval of the governor, and when directed by the
governor, shall inquire into matters concerning the
public peace, public safety and public justice. For such
purpose he may, in his discretion, and without civil
service examination, appoint and employ, and at
pleasure remove, such deputies, officers and other
persons as he deems necessary, determine their duties
and, with the approval of the governor, fix their com-
pensation.
"The attorney-general, his deputy, or other officer,
designated by him, is empowered to subpoena witnesses,
compel their attendance, examine them under oath
before himself or a magistrate and require the produc-
tion of any books or papers which he deems relevant or
material to the inquiry. If a person subpoenaed to
attend upon such inquiry fails to obey the command of
a subpoena without reasonable cause, or if a person in
attendance upon such inquiry shall, without reasonable
cause, refuse to be sworn or to be examined or to
answer a question or to produce a book or paper, when
ordered so to do by the officer conducting such inquiry,
he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. It shall be the duty
of all public officers, their deputies, assistants and
subordinates, clerks and employees, and all other
persons, to render and furnish to the attorney-general,
his deputy or other designated officer, when requested,
all information and assistance in their possession and
within their power .... " McKnsNm's CoNsoL. LAws.,
N. Y. EXEcUTIvE LAW, §63(8).
3 In re DiBrizzi, 303 N.Y. 206, 101 N.E.2d 464
(1951). This case arose out of the appointment of a
State Crime Commission to delve into organized crime
in New York. This Commission was appointed pursuant
to subsection 8 (set forth in the preceding footnote) as
an aid to the Attorney General in conducting a probe
of that subject. This means of implementing the sub-
section 8 powers of the Attorney General was approved
in DiBrizzi. The holding of public hearings in connec-
tion with this probe likewise was upheld in Application
of Bowers, 203 Misc. 653, 121 N.Y.S.2d 629, aff'd, 281
App. Div. 861, 119 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1952).
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The effectiveness of any of these forms of substi-
tution of the state attorney general for the local
prosecutor depends not only upon the character of
the attorney general and his staff, but also upon
certain political considerations. A state attorney
general of the same political party as a local
prosecutor is apt to be extremely hesitant to
embarrass a fellow standard-bearer by entering his
domain to initiate a prosecution, thereby declaring
to the electorate the inefficiency or corruptness of
their elected servant. On the other hand, a state
attorney general of the opposite party may be
inclined to intervene unnecessarily, merely to
generate rumors of corruption in the opposing
party.
C. Substitution of Private Persons
In the United States, the prosecution of criminal
cases historically and with minor exceptionsN has
been performed solely by public officials. In con-
trast, in England many criminal prosecutions are
initiated and conducted by private persons.Ps The
causes for the prevalence of private prosecution in
England are not related to organized crime or a
public prosecutor's refusal to prosecute. But it is
instructive to note that widespread use of this
method of prosecution does not necessarily bring
about a total breakdown of criminal justice.ne
A private person has no inherent right to
prosecute for criminal offenses, even though the
criminal act has caused him direct physical or
financial injury. Private prosecution must be
specifically authorized by statute if it is to become
available as a technique for circumventing a
corrupt local public prosecutor. It would not be
necessary for the containment of organized crime to
authorize the private prosecution of all criminal
-4 These exceptions generally fit into one of the fol-
lowing categories: (1) privately employed attorneys
conducting or assisting in prosecution with the consent
of the public prosecutor; (2) qui tam actions in which
private persons receive a share of the fine for success-
fully prosecuting certain offenses; (3) multiple damage
actions, which are civil suits with punitive aspects.
Comment, Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District
Attorney's Unwarranted Inaction, 65 YAlE L. J. 209,
218-23 (1955).
315 "This is considered the basic system for enforcing
the criminal law in England, particularly in regard to
the lesser offenses." JAcKsoN, THE MACHIMRY OF
CRMINAL JUSTIcE mn ENGLAND 108-10 (1953). Other
nations having private prosecution to some extent are
Scotland, France, Spain, Pakistan, and Germany.
Comment, supra note 334, at 224.
336 "Although reform movement and extensive code
revision has occurred in some of these countries, private
prosecution laws have emerged intact and have indeed,
not drawn significant criticism." Id. at 224.
offenses, but merely those offenses most likely to be
committed by criminal organizations.
Although no statute has been enacted author-
izing private criminal prosecution of violations of
gambling, prostitution, or similar laws, some states
allow private persons to conduct suits invoking
important non-criminal sanctions against some of
these offenses. It is quite common to find statutes
providing that a private person or group of persons
may seek a public nuisance injunction against
premises on which gambling, prostitution, or
similar offenses take place. In New York, "any
citizen of the county, or any society, association,
or body incorporated under the laws of this state,
may maintain an action in equity.., to per-
petually enjoin" a house of prostitution.N Illinois
has analogous provisions applicable to premises
utilized as houses of prostitutionN or in the distri-
bution and use of narcotics.Di Similarly, private
37 "Whoever shall erect, establish, continue, main-
tain, use, own or lease any building, erection, or place
used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prosti-
tution is guilty of maintaining a nuisance .... ." Mc-
KINNEY'S CONSOL. LAWS, N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
§2320.
"1. When a nuisance is kept, maintained, or exists,
as defined in this article, the district attorney, or any
citizen of the county, or any society, association, or body
incorporated under the laws of this state, may maintain
an action in equity in the name of the state of New
York, upon the relation of such district attorney, citi-
zen, or corporation to perpetually enjoin said nuisance,
the person or persons conducting or maintaining the
same from further conducting or maintaining the same,
and the owner, or agent of the building or ground upon
which said nuisance exists, from further permitting such
building or ground or both to be so used.
"2. Such action shall be brought in the supreme
court of the county in which the property is situated.
... " Id. §2321. (Emphasis supplied.)
"1. If the complaint in an action instituted pur-
suant to the provisions of this article, is filed by any
person or association, it shall not be dismissed except
upon a sworn statement made by the complainant and
his attorney, setting forth the reasons why the action
should be dismissed, and the dismissal is approved by
the district attorney in writing or in open court....
"If an action instituted pursuant to the provisions
of this article is brought by any person or association
and the court finds there were not reasonable grounds
or cause for said action the costs may be taxed against
such person or association." Id. §2325.
= ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 100kY, §§1-12.
33i "All places and fixtures and movable contents
thereof, used for the purpose of unlawfully selling,
serving, storing, keeping, giving away or using narcotic
drugs are hereby declared to be nuisances and may be
abated as hereinafter provided and the owners, agents,
and occupants of any such place may be enjoined as
hereinafter provided." ILL. RFV. STAT ch. 100j%,
§15.
"The Division or the State's Attorney or any citizen
of the county in which a nuisance exists may maintain a
complaint in the name of the People of the State of
Illinois, to enjoin all persons from maintaining or per-
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persons are often permitted to petition for the
revocation of liquor licenses. The Illinois statute
is typical:
"Any five residents of the city, village, or
county shall have the right to file a complaint
with the local commission stating that any
retail licensee, subject to the jurisdiction of the
local commission, has been or is violating the
provisions of this Act or the rules or regulations
issued pursuant hereto."3 10
Through procedures such as these private persons
can cripple criminal organizations even though
denied the power to institute criminal action
against them.
Private prosecution of organized crime as a
technique for circumventing the corrupted prose-
cutor depends, of course, upon the existence of a
body of interested, honest, and courageous citizens.
The ordinary activities in which criminal organi-
zations engage seldom cause serious physical
injury to its victims. Private prosecutors might
come forward in event of a rape, assault, or
murder, 34 but will not be motivated to enforce
gambling laws or similar legislation. A more
altruistically motivated, public-spirited body of
citizenry must be looked to for the institution of
private prosecutions against organization activities.
Where can such be found? Many cities have ready-
made groups in their voluntary crime commissions
-private citizens who have banded together in
organizations whose primary functions, thus far,
have been to investigate crime, particularly orga-
nized crime, and inform the public of its nature
and extent. Authorization of private prosecutions
would provide these organizations with a new
weapon, a new purpose, a new challenge.
42 If
mitting such nuisance, to abate the same and to enjoin
the use of any such place for the period of one year ......
Id. §16.
"If the existence of the nuisance is established, the
court shall enter a decree perpetually restraining all
persons from maintaining or permitting such nuisance,
and from using the place in which the same is main-
tained for any purpose for a period of one year there-
after,.. . and perpetually restraining the defendant
from maintaining any such nuisance within the juris-
diction of the court." Id. §19.
340 IL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §151.
341 "The injured individual was most severely harmed
by the criminal act; he will be equally affected by the
failure of society to prosecute." Comment, supra note
334, at 228.
4 An outline of a proposed private prosecution
statute is laid out in the Comment cited supra note 334,
at 229-33. In this formulation the court, in its dis-
cretion, may appoint a private prosecutor upon petition
by a private citizen and a showing that the public
honesty or courage is lacking in the local public
prosecutor, and in the local judiciary, and in the
state attorney general, then perhaps these qualities
can be found among the private citizens of the
community.
D. Substitution of the Federal Govermuent
All the techniques heretofore discussed for
remedying the situation created by a corrupt or
ineffective local prosecutor have called for re-
placing the prosecutor with some other person in
the conduct of state criminal prosecutions. In aid
of, or in place of, these techniques, it is becoming
more and more common for the federal government
to act, enforcing its own laws affecting organized
crime. Expansion of federal activity in the area of
organized crime has received impetus not only
because of corruption in local law enforcement,
but also because organized crime has become
interstate in scope, large and complex in nature,
and immensely rich in plunder. 33
In order to move against organized crime, it has
been necessary to enact legislation extending
federal jurisdiction over the types of criminal
activity in which criminal organizations specialize.
The federal government, of course, is confined
within its own constitutional perimeter; accord-
ingly, legislation has been predicated upon the
federal government's power over matters such as
interstate commerce,3-' the status of aliens,45
prosecutor had failed or refused to act. The public
prosecutor may seek to have the private prosecution
dismissed. However, the continuation of the action
remains in the hands of the court. The usefulness of
this formulation as a means of dealing with organized
crime depends upon the validity of one assumption-
that the integrity of the court has not yielded to the
same temptation of corrupt dollars or votes which
caused the prosecutor to fail to perform his duty to
prosecute in the first place. This defect could be obvi-
ated by rendering the trial court's decision concerning
a private person's petition to act as a prosecutor a
reviewable decision with a de novo hearing in the appel-
late court.
34 Although it seems to be the general consensus
among political leaders, prosecutors, judges, lawyers,
and the common citizen that organized crime is properly
a concern of the federal government, the opposite view
has not been without eminent support. See Adlai
Stevenson, Organized Crime and Law Enforcement: A
Problem for the People, 38 ABAJ 26 (1952).
34 "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, ... " U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
3- "The Congress shall have Power... To establish
an uniform Rule of Naturalization,. .. " U.S. CONST.
art. I, §8, cl. 4.
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certain geographical areasm5 taxes,5 7 and the
mails. m Various phases of organized crime's enter-
prises have been made federal crimes through
legislation based upon one and sometimes more of
these constitutional provisions. Of the six chief
sources of organization profits, four are susceptible
to federal jurisdiction, at least under some circum-
stances. 1 Thus, the narcotics traffic in virtually
all its phases has been subjected to federal juris-
diction through legislation grounded on the taxing
power and the power to regulate foreign and inter-
state commerce. As the result of this combination
of legislation, the illegitimate purchase, sale, or
possession of narcotics,3 1° the importation of these
316 "The Congress shall have Power. .. To define and
punish ... Felonies committed on the high seas, . . .To
exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever,
over such District... as may, .. . become the Seat of
the Government of the United States, and to exercise
like Authority over all Places purchased ... for the
Erection of Forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards,
and other needful Buildings .... " U.S. CONs . art. I,
§8, cls. 10-17.
47 "The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,... but all Duties,
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States." U. S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 1.
m8 "The Congress shall have Power... To establish
Post Offices and post Roads;..." U. S. CONST. art. I,
§8, cl. 7.
149 Organization profits appear to be derived pri-
marily from the following: gambling, "shylocking,"
racketeering, narcotics, prostitution, and legitimate
businesses. These activities were discussed in the first
installment of this article. See 53 J. Cint. L., C., &
P.S. 399, 402-06 (1962). Of these six areas of interest
only shylocking and legitimate business remain vir-
tually untouchable by federal power.
350 These transactions violate provisions based on
both the power to tax and the power to regulate foreign
commerce.
"It shall be unlawful for any person.., to manu-
facture, produce, compound, sell, deal in, dispense,
distribute, administer, or give away narcotic drugs
without having registered and paid the special tax
imposed ... ." 26 U.S.C. §4704.
"(c) It shall be unlawful for any person who has not
registered and paid the special tax... to have in his
possession ... narcotic drugs"; 26 U.S.C. §4724. These
sections apply to opium, isonipecaine, coca leaves,
opiate, their derivatives and chemical equivalents.
Parallel provisions render these same transactions un-
lawful with regard to marihuana. See 26 U.S.C. §4744
(possession) and 26 U.S.C. §4755(a) (trafficking).
"Whoever ... receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in
any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment,
or sale of any such narcotic drug after being imported
or brought in, knowing the same to have been imported
or brought into the United States contrary to law, or
conspires to commit any of such acts,... shall be
imprisoned not less than five or more than twenty
years and, in addition, may be fined not more than
$20,000. For a second or subsequent offense.., the
offender shall be imprisoned not less than ten or more
than forty years and, in addition, may be fined not
more than $20,000." 21 U.S.C. §174.
The penalties exacted for engaging in unlawful acts
drugs,351 the interstate transportation of nar-
cotics,3 52 and the use of a communication facility
in the commission of a narcotics offense 35 3 are all
federal crimes. 54 In addition, a narcotics violator
proscribed under 26 U.S.C. §4704 are set forth in 26
U.S.C. §7237. This section provides for graduated
penalties of two to five years, five to ten years, and ten
to twenty years, for first, second, and third offenders,
respectively. The federal government has imposed
particularly stiff penalties upon anyone providing
heroin to teenagers.
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, who-
ever, having attained the age of eighteen years, know-
ingly sells, gives away, furnishes, or dispenses ... any
heroin unlawfully imported ... to any person who has
not attained the age of eighteen years, may be fined not
more than $20,000, and shall be imprisoned for life, or
for not less than ten years, except that the offender
shall suffer death if the jury in its discretion shall sodirect. .. .." 21 U.S.C. §176b.
351 "It is unlawful to import or bring any narcotic
drug into the United States... except that such
amounts of crude opium and coca leaves as the Com-
missioner of Narcotics finds to be necessary to provide
for medical and legitimate uses only may be im-
ported... under such regulations as the Commis-
sioner of Narcotics shall prescribe ...... 21 U.S.C.
§173.
"Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or
brings any narcotic drug into the United States or any
territory under its control or jurisdiction, contrary to
law, ... shall be imprisoned not less than five or more
than twenty years and, in addition, may be fined not
more than $20,000. For a second or subsequent offense
... the offender shall be imprisoned not less than ten
or more than forty years and, in addition, may be
fined not more than $20,000." 21 U.S.C. §174. A sim-
ilar provision imposes criminal penalties for smug-
gling marihuana. See 21 U.S.C. §176a.
312 "Except as otherwise provided in this subsection,
it shall be unlawful for any person to send, ship, carry,
or deliver narcotic drugs from any State or Territory
or the District of Columbia, or any insular possession
of the United States, into any other State or Territory
or the District of Columbia, or any insular possession
of the United States .... . 26 U.S.C. §4724(b). This
applies to opium, isonipecaine, coca leaves, and opiate,
their derivatives and chemical equivalents. A parallel
provision, 26 U.S.C. §4755(b), also makes the interstate
transportation of marihuana illegal. Penalties for vio-
lation of these sections are set out in 26 U.S.C. §7237
(see note 350 supra).
m "(a) Whoever uses any communication facility
in committing or in causing or facilitating the commis-
sion of, or in attempting to commit, any act or acts
constituting [a narcotics offense] or a conspiracy to
commit [a narcotics offense] ....
"(b) For purposes of this section, the term 'com-
munication facility' means any and all public and
private instrumentalities used or useful in the trans-
mission of writings, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds
of all kinds by mail, telephone, wire, radio, or other
means of communication." 18 U.S.C. §1403.
35 The narcotics traffic has long been a primary con-
cern of the federal government. This concern has been
reflected in the enactment of legislation affording
special procedural advantages to the federal govern-
ment in the prosecution of narcotics cases, procedural
advantages not available in the usual federal criminal
case. Thus, the government is authorized to appeal
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must register upon entering or leaving the
country.3 5
Prostitution has been reached primarily through
the commerce power. The Mann Act prohibits the
interstate transportation of prostitutes, 5 6 and
recent legislation enacted as a part of the Justice
Department drive on organized crime punishes the
use of any facility of interstate commerce or the
mails in furtherance of a prostitution enterprise. 57
Similarly, most forms of racketeering violate
federal law if they result in an obstruction of inter-
state commerce.3us In effect, racketeering obstructs
orders suppressing evidence, 18 U.S.C. §1404, to
execute search warrants at any time of the day or
night, 18 U.S.C. §1405, and to extend immunity from
prosecution to encourage witnesses to testify against
their associates in crime, 18 U.S.C. §1406.
311 "[No citizen of the United States who is addicted
to or uses narcotic drugs, . . . or who has been con-
victed of a violation of any of the narcotic or mari-
huana laws of the United States, or of any State thereof,
the penalty for which is imprisonment for more than
one year, shall depart from or enter into or attempt to
depart from or enter into the United States, unless such
person registers... at a point of entry or a border
customs station ....
"Whoever violates any of the provisions of this sec-
tion shall be punished for each such violation by a fine
of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not less
than one nor more than three years, or both." 18
U.S.C. §1407.
356 "Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or
foreign commerce ... any woman or girl for the purpose
of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral
purpose.., shall be fined not more than $5,000 or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C.
§2421.
In addition to transportation of prostitutes, the
Mann Act punishes any person who "persuades, in-
duces, entices, or coerces" any woman to move in
interstate commerce for purposes of prostitution,
18 U.S.C. §2422, and the failure to file a true report
concerning any recently arrived alien kept as a prosti-
tute, 18 U.S.C. §2424. A double penalty ($10,000 and
ten years) is exacted for the crime of inducing a female
under 18 to travel in interstate commerce for the pur-
pose of engaging in prostitution. 18 U.S.C. §2423.
357 18 U.S.C. §1952. See note 369 infra for text of
this statute.
n5 "(a) [W]hoever in any way or degree obstructs,
delays or affects commerce or the movement of any
article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or
extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits
or threatens physical violence to any person or property
in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in
violation of this section shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both.
"(b) As used in this section-
"(1) The term 'robbery' means the unlawful taking
or obtaining of personal property from the person or in
the presence of another, against his will, by means of
actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury,
immediate or future, to his person or property, or
property in his custody or possession, or the person or
property of a relative or member of his family or of
commerce when directed against a business concern
having some connection with interstate com-
merce.
359 Moreover, use of any facility of interstate
commerce to further a racketeering attempt is a
federal crime, whether or not the racketeers are
aiming at a business connected with interstate
commerce.
36 0
Gambling, the source of half of the income of
organized crime, has been the focal point of the
Justice Department's renewed offensive against
organized crime and is the subject of most of the
legislation recently enacted to combat organized
crime. Prior to the new legislation, gambling was
outlawed in certain geographical areas subject to
federal jurisdiction, 361 use of the mails was un-
anyone in his company at the time of the taking or
obtaining.
"(2) The term 'extortion' means the obtaining of
property from another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence or
fear, or under color of official right ... ." 18 U.S.C.
§1951.
It should be noted that this section applies to only
two techniques employed by racketeers in attempting
to secure customers and discourage competitors-
robbery and extortion. Moreover, extortion has been
limited to the employment of threats to induce the
victim to surrender a payoff in money or other property.
319 "The term 'commerce' means commerce within
the District of Columbia, or any Territory or Posses-
sion of the United States; all commerce between any
point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District
of Columbia and any point outside thereof; all com-
merce between points within the same State through
any place outside such State; and all other commerce
over which the United States has jurisdiction." 18 U.S.C.
§1951(b)(3). (Emphasis supplied.)
This jurisdictional section has received a broad in-
terpretation in the federal courts.
"It seems apparent from the language of the statute
that it was the intent of Congress to protect interstate
commerce against extortion which in any way or in
any degree reasonably could be regarded as affecting
such commerce. The exaction of tribute from con-
tractors engaged in local construction work who are
dependent upon interstate commerce for materials,
equipment, and supplies, or who are engaged in con-
structing facilities to serve such commerce is, in our
opinion, proscribed by the statute in suit." Hulahan
v. United States, 214 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856, which applied this section to
an extortion attempt against a local contractor using
materials imported from other states. Accord, Nick v.
United States, 122 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 687 (threats to interfere with exhibition
of films received in interstate commerce); United
States v. Stirone, 262 F.2d 571 (3rd Cir. 1958), aff'd,
361 U.S. 212 (contractor using sand from out of state
and furnishing concrete manufactured therefrom for
construction of steel mill which would produce steel
for shipment in interstate commerce).
360 18 U.S.C. §1952. See note 369 infra for text of this
statute.
361 "(a) It shall be unlawful ...
(1) to set up, operate, or own or hold any interest in
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lawful in connection with certain types of gambling
schemes,362 and the interstate transportation of slot
machines was prohibited. 3 3 Moreover, a 10%
excise tax 34 and a $50 annual occupational tax3 5
any gambling ship or any gambling establishment on
any gambling ship;...
"(b) Whoever violates the provisions of subsection
(a) of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
"(c) Whoever being... (2) the owner of any vessel
under or within the jurisdiction of the United States...
shall use, or knowingly permit the use of, such vessel
in violation of any provision of this section shall ...
forfeit such vessel, together with her tackle, apparel,
and furniture, to the United States." 18 U.S.C. §1082.
A companion section, 18 U.S.C. §1083, prohibits the
use of any vessel for the transportation of persons be-
tween a gambling ship and land.
36 "Whoever... carries in interstate or foreign com-
merce any paper, certificate, or instrument purporting
to be or to represent a ticket, chance, share, or interest
in or dependent upon the event of a lottery, gift enter-
prise, or similar scheme... or knowingly takes or re-
ceives any such paper, certificate, instrument, adver-
tisement, or list so ... transported, shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both." 18 U.S.C. §1301. Companion statutes
proscribe the sending of lottery materials through the
mails, 18 U.S.C. §1302, the broadcasting of lottery in-
formation by a radio station, 18 U.S.C. §1303, and pro-
hibit postal employees from acting as agents for lot-
teries, 18 U.S.C. §1304.
363 "It shall be unlawful knowingly to transport any
gambling device to any place in a State, ... from any
place outside of such State,..." 15 U.S.C. §1172.
M "(a) There shall be imposed on wagers, as defined
in section 4421, an excise tax equal to 10 percent of
the amount thereof ....
"(c) Each person who is engaged in the business of
accepting wagers shall be liable for and shall pay the
tax under this subchapter on all wagers placed with
him. Each person who conducts any wagering pool or
lottery shall be liable for and shall pay the tax under
this subchapter on all wagers placed in such pool or
lottery .... " 26 U.S.C. §4401. The constitutionality of
the wagering tax provisions was upheld against con-
tentions that they constituted a penalty in the guise of
a tax, that they infringed on the police power reserved
to the states, and that they violated the privilege
against self-incrimination, in United States v. Kahriger,
345 U.S. 22 (1953), and Lewis v. United States, 348
U.S. 419 (1955).
=" "There shall be imposed a special tax of $50 per
year to be paid by each person who is liable for tax
under section 4401 or who is engaged in receiving
wagers for or on behalf of any person so liable." 26
U.S.C. §4411. All persons liable for this tax must
register with the District Director of Internal Revenue
their names and addresses and pertinent information.
See 26 U.S.C. §4412. In United States v. Calamaro, 354
U.S. 351 (1957), the Supreme Court held that the only
members of a gambling operation who are liable for this
occupational tax are those who have a "proprietary"
interest in the operation, the so-called "bankers," and
those who accept the wagers directly from the betters,
the so-called "writers." "Pick-up men," "headquarters
personnel," guards, and others performing services
vital to the organization are not encompassed within
the taxing or registration provisions.
were levied on those engaged in bookmaking,
lotteries, and certain other forms of gambling3 6
The new legislation, relying upon the federal power
to regulate interstate commerce, prohibits the
interstate transmission of wagering information63
and the interstate transportation of wagering
paraphernalia,16 thus denying to organized illegal
gambling the wire services it requires and compli-
cating the procurement and handling of gambling
devices, betting slips, and related paraphernalia.
366 "(1) ... The term 'wager' means-
(A) any wager with respect to a sports event or a
contest placed with a person engaged in the
business of accepting such wagers,(B) any wager placed in a wagering pool with re-
spect to a sports event or a contest, if such pool
is conducted for profit, and
(C) any wager placed in a lottery conducted for
profit.
(2) ... The term 'lottery' includes the numbers
game, policy, and similar types of wagering. The term
does not include-
(A) any game of a type in which usually
(i) the wagers are placed,
(ii) the winners are determined, and(iii) the distribution of prizes or other property
is made, in the presence of all persons plac-
ing wagers in such game ... ." 26 U.S.C.
§4421.
The effect of subsection (2)(A) is to exempt from the
wagering tax poker, blackjack, roulette, and other
casino-type gambling games in which all participants
in the game are present during all phases of the game.
Lotteries conducted by tax exempt organizations are
also excluded from these taxes under subsection (2)(B).
367 "Whoever being in the business of betting or
wagering knowingly uses a wire communication fa-
cility for the transmission in interstate or foreign com-
merce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the
placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or con-
test or for the transmission of a wire communication
which entities the recipient to receive money or credit
as a result of bets or wagers or for information assisting
in the placing of bets or wagers is guilty of a felony."
18 U.S.C. §1084. For an analysis of the legislative
history of this statute, see Pollner, Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy's Legislative Program To Curb
Organized Crime and Racketeering, 28 BROOKLYN L.
Rzv. 37 (1961).
368 "(a) Whoever,... knowingly carries or sends in
interstate or foreign commerce any record, parapher-
nalia, ticket, certificate, bills, slip, token, paper, writing,
or other device used, or to be used, or adapted, devised,
or designed for use in (a) bookmaking; or (b) wagering
pools with respect to a sporting event; or (c) in a num-
ber, policy, bolita, or similar game shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than
five years or both." 18 U.S.C. §1953. Subsection (b)
of this statute exempts certain paraphernalia:
"(1) parimutuel equipment where parimutuel bet-
ting is legal,(2) betting materials transported into a state where
betting on sports events is legal,
(3) betting information contained in newspapers
and other similar publications." For an analysis of the




However, the most comprehensive weapon forged
by the 87th Congress was the so-called "travel
bill," which renders criminal any travel in inter-
state commerce or any use of a facility in interstate
commerce or any use of the mails in furtherance
of a gambling enterprise.369 The same section
prohibits these interstate acts when committed in
connection with prostitution and racketeering.3" If
this statute is accorded the same liberal interpre-
tation with regard to the required connection
between the illegal enterprise and interstate
commerce that has been prevalent in the con-
struction of most other federal criminal laws
premised upon the commerce power, this section
should extend federal jurisdiction over broad
361 "(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign
commerce or uses any facility in interstate or foreign
commerce, including the mail, with intent to(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity;
or
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any
unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on,
or facilitate the promotion, management, estab-
lishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of
the acts specified in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3),
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for
not more than five years, or both.
"(b) As used in this section 'unlawful activity' means
(1) any business enterprise involving gambling, liquor
on which the Federal excise tax has not been paid,
narcotics, or prostitution offenses in violation of the
laws of the State in which they are committed or of
the United States... " 18 U.S.C. §1952.
There appear to be four major elements which must
be established in a prosecution under this statute:
first, that the accused traveled or used a facility (this
might include telegraph, telephone, radio, railroad, bus,
or other form of transmission or transportation) in
interstate commerce; second, that the accused in
traveling or using such facility intended to distribute
the proceeds, commit a crime of violence, or perform
other acts which facilitate the conduct of a business
enterprise; third, that the business enterprise facili-
tated by such acts involved a form of gambling (or
other enumerated activity) illegal in the state where
committed or under federal law; fourth, that the
accused, after traveling or using a facility in interstate
commerce, committed or attempted to commit one of
the proscribed acts in furtherance of such business.
This statute extends federal jurisdiction over a
number of factual situations typical of the conduct of
organized crime. Among these are the importation of
out-of-state gunmen to maim or murder, the collection
of gambling debts from out-of-state betters, and the
distribution of profits to an organization leader in
another state. For an analysis of the legislative history
of this statute, see Pollner, supra note 367.
370 "(b) As used in this section 'unlawful activity'
means (1) any business enterprise involving... nar-
cotics, or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws
of the State in which they are committed or of the
United States." 18 U.S.C. §1952. See note 369 supra
for text of this statute.
areas of organized criminal activity. Very slight
and incidental uses of the mails or contacts with
interstate commerce have been held sufficient to
invoke federal power under mail fraud,nI interstate
transportation of stolen goods,372 and similar laws.
Federal jurisdiction is not limited to the major
profit-making enterprises of organized crime, gam-
bling, narcotics, racketeering, and prostitution; it
also encompasses certain of the subsidiary crimes
committed by an organization in order to acquire
or maintain its power in the community. The
threats and violence used to consolidate its position
violate federal law if the channels of interstate
commerce are utilized' 3 or if these acts interfere
with interstate commerce. 4 Moreover, the transfer
or possession of the most effective instruments of
violence, submachine guns and sawed-off shotguns,
violates federal law unless a special federal tax is
paid and the owner is registered with federal
authorities.~57 Bribery of local officials, the primary
371 See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 202 F.2d
400 (6th Cir. 1953), in which it was held that a fraudu-
lent scheme violates the federal mail fraud statute,
18 U.S.C. §1341, even though it was not intended that
the mails be used in the execution of the scheme and
even if the mailing which actually occurred was only
incidental to the scheme. Illustrative are cases holding
that deposit of checks drawn on out-of-state banks
(Marvin v. United States, 279 F.2d 451 (10th Cir.
1960)) and mailing of lulling communications to pacify
the victims after a scheme has been completed (Blue
v. United States, 138 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 322 U.S. 736) constitute uses of the mail pro-
scribed by the act.
372 "The transporting charge does not require proof
that any specific means of transporting were used....
When Pereira delivered the check, drawn on an out-of-
state bank, to the El Paso bank for collection, he
'caused' it to be transported in interstate commerce."
Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9 (1954). Accord,
United States v. Doran, 299 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 925.
313 "(a) Whoever travels.., or uses any facility in
interstate or foreign commerce... with intent to-
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any
unlawful activity;
(b) As used in this section 'unlawful activity'
means... (2) extortion... in violation of the laws of
the State in which committed or of the United States."
18 U.S.C. §1952. See note 369 supra for text of this
statute.
3- 18 U.S.C. §1951. See notes 358 and 359 supra and
accompanying text.
31- "It shall be unlawful for any person to receive or
possess any firearm which has at any time been trans-
ferred in violation of [provisions requiring payment of
manufacturers' tax, retailers' tax or transfer tax, and
registration]. Whenever on trial for a violation of this
section the defendant is shown to have or to have had
possession of such firearm, such possession shall be
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction,
unless the defendant explains such possession to the
satisfaction of the jury." 26 U.S.C. §5851.
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means by which criminal organizations remain
secure from criminal prosecution, likewise violates
federal law if any facility of interstate commerce
is employed in connection with the bribery.V6
Before enactment of the recent legislation di-
rected against organized crime, the most potent
federal weapons were tax fraud prosecutions n and
deportation proceedingsY8 These techniques were
discussed in detail, in a previous installment of
this series, as examples of one approach to the
problem of organized crime-the prosecution of
organization leaders for crimes unrelated to the
organization's primary activities019 The necessity
for resorting to this indirect approach to the
prosecution of organization leaders should di-
minish with the advent of statutes which afford
the federal government other bases of jurisdiction
over the activities of organized crime. However, it
is doubtful that the indirect method will fall into
complete disuse. It still remains virtually the only
feasible approach where an interstate nexus does
not exist or cannot be proved.
In the grant of at least some federal jurisdiction
over organized crime, a firm initial step has been
taken toward affording the local prosecutor a
valued ally if he is honest and an effective substi-
tute if he is corrupt. However, the primary focus
in the federal area thus far has been upon supplying
federal authorities with jurisdiction over organized
crime, to the neglect of equipping federal law en-
forcement with the legal weapons essential to a
successful campaign against that foe. Many states
have legislation better designed to cope with
organized crime than the federal government pos-
sesses. Such elementary techniques as immunity,
wiretapping, and closing of premises used for
illegal enterprises are either non-existent or avail-
able only with regard to a narrowly limited class
of offenses. Because of the reputation for honesty
which the federal government enjoys, many people
have high expectations for its success against
376 "(b) As used in this section 'unlawful activity'
means... (2) ... bribery in violation of the laws of the
State in which committed or of the United States."
18 U.S.C. §1952. See note 369 supra for remainder of
text of this statute.
37 26 U.S.C. §7201 et seq., discussed in the second
installment of this article. See, 54 J. CaRi. L., C. &
P.S. 1, 16-18 (1963).
378 These statutory sections were discussed in the
second installment of this article. See, 54 J. Can. L.,
C. & P.S. 1, 18-20 (1963).
371 This approach was discussed and evaluated in the
second installment of this article at 54 J. CRi. L., C.
& P.S. 1, 15-21 (1963).
criminal organizations, expecting it to play a
leading role in the struggle against organized
crime. But until Congress elects to furnish the
federal law enforcement arm with the basic
weaponry for a contest against organized crime,
the federal government is forced to play its role
with a short lance and a dull sword.
II. TECHNIQUES FOR DISCOURAGING OFFICIALS
FRom BEHAVING IMPROPERLY
Every potentially corrupt or actually corrupted
officer, from patrolman to judge, is in constant
tension. He must make two basic decisions-first,
whether to accept "favors" from a criminal organi-
zation and, second, once a "debt" is owed the
organization, whether to perform in a given situ-
ation in accord with the wishes of that organization.
These decisions will be influenced at least some-
what by what the tempted individual considers
the legal consequences are likely to be if his
improper action is discovered. If the sanctions are
severe and the probability of their imposition
great, many tempted officials may be deterred
from becoming corrupt, and corrupted individuals
may be influenced not to behave improperly in a
given case. Two categories of sanctions are avail-
able against public officials who act improperly-
civil and criminal.
A. Civil Sanctions Against Corrupt Officials
The civil remedies have the purpose of ousting
the offending official from his government position.
Ouster has the dual effect of purging law enforce-
ment of a traitor and of serving as a warning to
others who might be tempted to follow a similar
path.
At least three different types of civil remedies are
available in various states: personal removal ac-
tions, both executive and judicial,3uo proceedings to
remove the prosecutor's name from the rolls of
court,33I and administrative removal proceedings.m2
New York law exemplifies removal by the
executive. Any officer appointed by the Governor
alone can be removed by the Governor after a
proper hearing on the charges made against him.m
380 See, e.g., State v. Allen, 126 Fla. 878, 172 So. 222
(1937); In re Byrne, 193 La. 566, 191 So. 729 (1939).
381 See, e.g., Wilbur v. Howard, 70 F. Supp. 930
(E.D. Ky. 1947).
382 This category includes the common Civil Service
Hearing. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, §§51, 51.1.
383 "An officer appointed by the governor. . . whose
appointment is not required by law to be made by and
with the advice and consent of the senate, any county
EARL JOHNSON, JR.
If the officer involved has been appointed by the
Governor with the advice and consent of the state
legislature, then he may be removed by the
legislature upon recommendation from the Gov-
ernor.m In California, removal by judicial action,
rather than by the executive, obtains. Such action
is instituted by a grand jury accusation, and trial
of the charge is before a jury. 5 Although technical
rules of evidence are not binding in such a pro-
ceeding,O it is conducted essentially as a regular
criminal trial.m
Many critical law enforcement positions, par-
ticularly within the police arm, are part of the state
civil service system. When individuals holding such
positions are corrupted, their removal can be
attained only through administrative procedures
established under the civil service system. In
Illinois, a member of the police force cannot be
removed or suspended for longer than 30 days for
accepting a bribe or failing to enforce laws unless
he has received a hearing by the so-called Police
treasurer, any county superintendent of the poor, any
register of a county may be removed by the gover-
nor.., after giving to such officer a copy of the charges
against him and an opportunity to be heard in his
defense." McKINNEV'S CONSOL. LAWS, N.Y. PUBLIC
OFFICERs LAW §33.
311 "The governor before making a recommendation
to the senate for the removal of any officer may in his
discretion take proofs, for the purpose of determining
whether such recommendation shall be made.... An
officer appointed by the governor by and with the
advice and consent of the senate, except an officer who
is or any or either of the officers who are the head of a
department, and except as otherwise provided by
special provision of law may be removed by the senate
upon the recommendation of the governor ......
McKINNEY'S CONSOL. LAWS, N.Y. PUBLIC OrfFICERS
LAW §32.
385 "An accusation in writing against any officer of a
district, county, or city, including any member of the
governing board of a school district, for wilful or cor-
rupt misconduct in office, may be presented by the
grand jury of the county for or in which the officer
accused is elected or appointed. An accusation may
not be presented without the concurrence of at least
12 grand jurors.. .. " DEERiNG'S CA-Lip. Conas ANN.
(Government) §3060.
"Upon a conviction and at the time appointed by
the court it shall pronounce judgment that the de-
fendant be removed from office. To warrant a
removal, the judgment shall be entered upon the
minutes, and the causes of removal shall be assigned
therein." Id. §3072. "Corrupt misconduct" comprises
any wilful malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance.
People v. Tice, 144 C.A.2d 750, 301 P.2d 588 (1956).
386 People v. Harby, 51 C.A.2d 759, 125 P.2d 874
(1942).
387 "The trial shall be by a jury, and conducted in all
respects in the same manner as the trial of an indict-
ment." DEERNG'S CALn. CoDEs Au m. (Government)
§3070.
Board.m If the charges are established by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, 9 the Board by
majority vote can cause the dismissal of the
offending police officer.390
All of these civil methods of discouraging corrupt
action are subject to an inherent weakness. The
financial rewards held out by organized crime may
so overshadow the economic value of the officer's
government position that the prospect of risking
his job will not dissuade him from becoming a vas-
sal to organized crime. In weighing the possible
loss of government salary against the riches to be
gleaned from being in league with a criminal
organization, the officer may find the balance
tipped toward the latter course.
Despite this obvious deficiency, the civil sanc-
tions possess certain advantages over the more
severe penalties of the criminal sanctions against
corrupt action. Ordinarily they are available
against lesser forms of misconduct than would
justify a criminal proceeding. 39' For example, close
personal association with members of criminal
organizations or conflict-of-interest business ar-
398 "In any city of more than 500,000 population in
which this Act is in operation, no officer or employee of
the police department in the classified civil service of
the city whose appointment has become complete shall
be removed or discharged, or suspended for more than
30 days except for cause upon written charges and
after an opportunity to be heard in his own defense by
the Police Board ....
"The Police Board shall establish rules of procedure
not inconsistent with the provisions of this section
respecting notice of charges and the conduct of the
hearings before the Police Board. The Police Board
shall not be bound by formal or technical rules of
evidence, however, hearsay evidence shall be inad-
missible. The person against whom charges have been
filed shall have the right to appear before the Police
Board with counsel of his own choice and defend him-
self; shall have the right to be confronted by his ac-
cusers; shall have the right to cross-examine any
witness giving evidence against him; and shall have
the right by counsel to present witnesses and evidence in
his own behalf...." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, §51.1.
389 In Oratowski v. Civil Service Com'n of City of
Chicago, 3 Ill. App. 2d 551, 123 N.E.2d 146 (1954),
it was decided that the civil standard of a preponder-
ance of the evidence obtained in civil service proceed-
ings rather than the more onerous criminal standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
390 "The concurrence of a majority of the members of
the Police Board shall be necessary for any disciplinary
recommendation or action entered." ILL. RV. STAT.
ch. 24, §51.1.
3191 "Civil remedies.., are more flexible than criminal
prosecutions in that they need not be based upon the
commission of a crime." Note, Legal Methods for the
Suppression of Organized Crime: Legal Remedies Against
Corrupt Law Enforcement Officers, 48 J. CRIs.. L., C. &
P.S. 414, 420 (1958).
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rangements with them sometimes can be the
predicate for dismissal of a government official.3n
Moreover, in civil proceedings a lesser standard of
proof and less rigorous procedures usually prevail
than those obtaining in criminal actions.393
B. Criminal Sanctions Against Corrupt Officials
The three applicable common law criminal ac-
tions are malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-
feasance. They may be differentiated as follows:
malfeasance involves doing an act wrongful in
itself,3n such as accepting a bribe;395 misfeasance
constitutes doing a lawful act in an improper
manner;398 nonfeasance entails a failure to perform
an act which the official has a duty to perform.3
In misfeasance and nonfeasance suits, a "corrupt
motive" generally must be established if the act
omitted or improperly performed was a dis-
cretionary act.3  Only "wilfulness" need be shown
if the act was ministerial.
3 99
Although the common law labels, malfeasance,
39People v. Becker, 112 C.A.2d 324, 246 P.2d 103
(1952).39 "In criminal proceedings against public officials,
the prosecutor is governed by general rules governing
the weight and sufficiency of evidence in criminal
prosecution. Furthermore, the rules as to admissibility
of evidence in criminal prosecution usually apply in
criminal action against officials. Thus, if the law en-
forcement official has neglected his duties, or per-
formed them improperly, but there is insufficient evi-
dence to support a criminal charge of nonfeasance, a
civil action may at least permit his removal from
office." Note, supra note 391, at 422. However, some
cases have held that the state must discharge the same
burden of proof in a civil removal action as would per-
tain in a criminal prosecution for the same alleged
misconduct in office. Phillips v. State, 75 Okla. 46
(1919); cf., Sheen v. Paine, 32- Utah 295, 90 Pac. 440
(1907).
,91 Speer v. State, 130 Ark. 457, 198 S.W. 113 (1917);
Ex parle Amos, 112 So. 289 (Fla. 1927).
395 State v. Jefferson, 88 N.J.L. 447, 97 Atl. 162
(1916).316 Holmes v. Osborn, 57 Ariz. 522, 115 P.2d 775
(1941); ordinarily self gain is not an ingredient of the
crime of misfeasance.39 Hardie v. Coleman, 155 Fla. 119, 155 So. 129
(1934).
398 State v. Wheatlery, 192 Md. 44, 63 A.2d 644
(1949). "Most acts performed by a prosecutor, for in-
stance, are discretionary. This requirement of 'corrupt
intent' is designed to protect the discretionary official
from indictment for mere error of judgment or for
mistake of law." Note, supra note 391, at 424.
399 State v. Sweeten, 83 NJ.L. 364, 85 Atl. 309
(1912); Commonwealth v. Hubbs, 133 Pa. Super. 244,
8 A.2d 618 (1939). Most acts performed by policemen,
for instance, fit in this category of "ministerial" acts,
i.e., acts which they are under a duty to perform as
specified in a statute or official regulation.
misfeasance and nonfeasance, have been dropped
in many states, the statutes still reflect these tra-
ditional concepts of official misbehavior. In the
recently enacted Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 all
three crimes are unified in the offense "Official
Misconduct," which is defined as follows:
"A public officer or employee commits mis-
conduct when, in his official capacity, he commits
any of the following acts:
(a) Intentionally or recklessly fails to perform
any mandatory duty as required bylaw; or
(b) Knowingly performs an act which he
knows he is forbidden by law to perform;
or
(c) With intent to obtain a personal ad-
vantage for himself or another, he per-
forms an act in excess of his lawful
authority; or
(d) Solicits or knowingly accepts for the per-
formance of any act a fee or reward which
he knows is not authorized by law. 490
In addition to those sanctions aimed generally
at misbehavior by public officials, some states have
recognized the special temptations offered by
criminal organizations and have enacted statutes
specially designed to cope with the misconduct
peculiar to the organized crime field. In New
York 401 and California ° an affirmative duty is
placed upon all law enforcement officers and
prosecutors diligently to investigate and prosecute
gambling offences. Any omission to perform these
duties is rendered criminal. Under these statutes
it is unnecessary to prove a corrupt or evil motive
to sustain a conviction, inasmuch as acts which
400 ILL. CR. CoDE art. 33-3 (1961).
401 "It is the duty of all sheriffs, constables and police
officers to inform against all persons whom they have
reason to believe are offenders against the provision
of this article [anti-gambling]; and it shall be the duty
of prosecuting or district attorneys to prosecute such
persons. Any omission by the officers herein men-
tioned of their respective duties shall be punishable by
a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars." McKruemY's
CoNsor.. LAws, N.Y. PENAL CODE §997.
40 "Every district attorney, sheriff, constable, or
police officer must inform against and diligently prose-
cute persons whom they have reasonable cause to
believe are offenders against the provisions of this
chapter [chapter on gaming], and every such officer
refusing or neglecting so to do, is guilty of a mis-
demeanor." DEFauNG's CALir. CODES Ar. (Penal)
§335. Prosecutions under this statute have included
the conviction of a police officer for failing to inform
against and diligently prosecute gambling offenses.
Coffey v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. 525, 82 Pac. 75(1905).
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were previously discretionary have been rendered
obligatory.
Criminal prosecutions for official misconduct
have undeniable advantages over the more often
employed civil remedies. The severe penalties and
widespread publicity associated with a criminal
proceeding probably have a greater deterrent
effect upon public officials contemplating im-
proper actions than do the consequences of a civil
removal proceeding. 403 The publicity attending
such a trial also has subsidiary effects which may
prove damaging to the criminal organization. The
public is aroused at least temporarily and may
demand stricter law enforcement. Also, patronage
of the organization's enterprises may well fall
off. These latter effects will give even a criminal
organization reason to pause.
III. TECHNIQUES FOR MINIMIZING THE EFFECTS
OF IMPROPER OFFICIAL BEHAVIOR WHEN IT
DOES OCCUR
No matter how effective the criminal and civil
sanctions against official misbehavior may be,
some officials will be corrupted, and some corrupt
officials will perform their duties in accordance
with the wishes of organized crime. Thus, the
focus of the problem of corruption shifts from
whether improper action will be taken to the
magnitude of such action and the permanency
of its effects.
The system for prosecuting persons suspected
of crime which has evolved in our country con-
tains a whole procession of built-in safeguards to
insure that an innocent man will not be punished
mistakenly. At almost every stage of the prosecu-
tive process, there are provisions for review of any
determination that the accused should be held to
account for the crime. The decision of the police
officer or Justice of the Peace that there was ample
cause for arrest of the accused is reviewable in a
hearing on a motion to suppress evidence seized
incidental to the arrest. The decision to hold an
accused for grand jury action is reviewed in a
preliminary hearing. The sufficiency of the in-
dictment and compliance with procedural re-
quirements during the indictment process are
103 "A successful criminal prosecution can serve as an
object lesson to other officials who might be, or might
contemplate being in the pay of organized crime....
The nature of a criminal prosecution is such that
newspapers and other mass media seize upon it as good
selling material, with the result that such a prosecution
of a public official may be clothed with publicity, often
sensationalized." Note, supra note 391, at 421.
reviewable through a motion to dismiss. After the
trial, not only the trial itself but the entire pro-
ceeding against the defendant from arrest onward
is subject to close scrutiny by one or more levels
of appellate courts. And finally, in addition to
appeal, various post conviction remedies are
usually provided to gain the freedom of a man
who was erroneously convicted.
By contrast, in our system there are no pro-
cedures to insure that a guilty man will not be
freed erroneously. If at any step during the
prosecution of an individual a decision is reached,
no matter how grievously in error or how cor-
ruptly motivated, that the accused is innocent or
some procedural requirement ignored, he goes
free. Ordinarily no review of any such decision to
suppress prosecution of the accused is available. °0
Thus, our criminal procedure resembles a series
of contests, all of which must be won by the
government to convict, but only one of which
must be won by the defendant, whether by fair
means or foul, to conclude the entire series in
his favor. Each prosecution victory may have to
sustain appellate scrutiny, while in most juris-
dictions a victory by the defendant is unimpeach-
able.405 This system is an open invitation to corrup-
tion. When organized crime is a defendant it must
merely obtain corrupt action at one of the many
stages in the prosecutive process to protect itself.
It does not have to fear reversal of the corrupt
decision, which is final and unappealable.
A means of withdrawing this invitation to
corruption is to provide closer supervision of
corruptible elements of the law enforcement body
by relatively incorruptible elements. A pair of
examples may illustrate the technique.
A corrupt prosecutor often furthers the ends of
the criminal organization by "nollei prosing" a
prosecution in which the organization has an
interest. Now, with an honest judge, if the state
required, as some do, judicial approval of the
prosecutor's decision to "nollei pross" a case," 6
404 The states vary widely in the scope of the state's
right to appeal in criminal cases. Connecticut, Vermont,
and California are typical of the liberal jurisdictions.
Vermont actually stipulates that the state's right of
appeal shall be coextensive with the defendant's right
of appeal. VT. STAT. AN. tit. 13, §7403 (1957). How-
ever, most states do not allow appeal by the states from
the trial-in-chief, limiting appeal to certain pre-trial
motions. Kronenberg, Right of a State To A ppeal Crid-
nal Cases, 49 J. Cans. L., C. & P.S. 473, 477 (1959).
405 See note 404 supra.
406 "The entry of a nolle prosequi is abolished, and
neither the attorney-general nor the district attorney
can discontinue or abandon a prosecution for a public
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the improper decision which the organization had
induced the prosecutor to make might avail them
nothing. The honest judge, in discharging his
duty of supervising the prosecutor, would probably
deny the prosecuter his request to "nollei pross"
the case, and the organization purpose would be
thwarted.
A corrupt judge often serves the criminal or-
ganization by destroying the prosecution's case
through grant of a motion to suppress physical
evidence even though the search was lawful. This
ill-gotten decision would reap no dividends to the
organization if it were appealable to a presumably
honest appellate court system.!°7 The appellate
court would merely reverse the trial court, and the
case would go to trial complete with the originally
suppressed physical evidence. New York recently
enacted a statute extending to the state the right
to appeal a lower court decision in this vital
area.403 However, the effect of corruption will be
materially reduced only when every decision
rendered by prosecutor, judge, or jury is amenable
offense, except as provided in the last section." DEER-
ING'S CALT. CODEs ANN. (Penal) §1386. "The court
may, either of its own motion or upon the application
of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance ofjustice, order an action to be dismissed. The reasons of
the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon
the minutes. No dismissal shall be made for any cause
which would be ground of demurrer to the accusatory
pleading." DEERING'S CAlIF. CODES ANN. (Penal)§1385. See also, McKINNEY'S CoNsoL. LAWS, N.Y.
CODE OF Cum. Proc. §672.
407 Recent federal legislation in the area of narcotics
control authorizes appeal from motions to suppress in
this narrow but important class of federal criminal
cases. See 18 U.S.C. §1404 (1960).
408 On April 29, 1962, the following provision and
several companion sections became effective:
"In taking an appeal from an order granting a motion
for the return of property or suppression of evidence
pursuant to subdivision six of section five hundred
eighteen, the people must file, in addition to a notice of
appeal as required by section five hundred twenty-two,
a statement asserting that the deprivation of the use
as evidence of the property ordered to be returned or
suppressed, has rendered the sum of the proof available
to the people with respect to a criminal charge which
has been filed in a court, or which the people propose to
file or to cause to be filed in a court, either (1) insuffi-
cient as a matter of law, or (2) so weak in its entirety
that any reasonable possibility of prosecuting such
charge or prospective charge to a conviction has been
effectively destroyed.
"The taking of such an appeal and the filing of such
a statement shall constitute a bar to the filing of any
criminal charge and to the prosecution of any existing
criminal charge against the moving party involving
the property in question, unless and until the order of
return or suppression is reversed on appeal and va-
cated." McKnxi zy's CONSOL. LAWS, CODE OF ConR.
PRoc. §518-a.
to supervision and possible correction through
appeal by the state.409
Another means of circumscribing the power of a
corrupt official to serve a criminal organization is
the reduction of the number and scope of dis-
cretionary decisions he may make relative to the
activities of organized crime. For example, the
value of a bribed judge to a criminal organiza-
tion is significantly reduced if his absolute discre-
tion in the sentencing process is withdrawn and
he is required by law to impose a certain minimum
term of imprisonment. Federal law sets such
mandatory sentences for narotic offenses,410 and
several states prescribe minimum sentences for
gambling offenses and certain other crimes 11
The same principle applies when an affirmative
duty is imposed upon prosecutors to investigate
and fully prosecute all gambling offenses brought
to their attention. The possibility of corrupt action
remains, but the potential scope of such action is
sharply limited.
IV. TEcmQuEs FOR MAXUMING THE RESuLTs
AN HONEST ELEMENT WITIN THE Gov.ERN-
MENT CAN ACHIEvE DESPITE T E PRESENCE OF
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
Any successful drive against organized crime
requires a degree of teamwork among the various
levels of law enforcement and among individuals
at each level. When some members of the team
are in reality working for the opposition, the
problems are multiplied many times. If some of
the police are corrupt, they fail to "see" organiza-
tion activities going on under their noses, or they
fail to investigate properly. If some of the prosecu-
tor's staff are corrupt, they bungle cases assigned to
them which may injure the organization. A corrupt
judge or court clerk may leak the information
that a search warrant has been issued against an
organization establishment. Accepting the proba-
bility that corruption exists among at least some
persons at all these levels, how do we minimize
their influence over law enforcement? Or, con-
versely, how can the power of non-corrupted law
enforcement officials be maximized?
The ideal sought by most proponents of sound
administrative practice is a single unified law
409 Concerning the constitutionality of extending to
the state a full spectrum right of appeal, see Annota-
tions, 113 A.L.R. 636, 157 A.L.R. 1065.
410 See, 18 U.S.C. §1407, 21 U.S.C. §174, 26 U.S.C.
§7237.
411 See, e.g., MrN. STATS. ANN. §623.20.
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enforcement body, each arm of which confines its
actions to the special sphere which is assigned as
its responsibility and each arm dependent upon
specialists within other sections for services essen-
tial to the completion of any investigation or
prosecution. Thus, a prosecutor prosecutes and
depends upon detectives for investigation, a crime
laboratory for scientific appraisal of evidence,
and policemen for execution of search and arrest
warrants. In theory, this leads to a smooth func-
tioning machine with each element of the whole
performing those tasks for which it is best prepared
by training, talent, and experience. Unfortunately,
that system of organization and practice which is
best suited to the administration of the criminal
law where the latter is carried on in a vacuum
may be the one most susceptible to the monkey
wrench of political corruption. The closely meshed
gears of an efficient law enforcement machine
may be thrown awry by a few well-placed bribes.
Laws which reduce the dependence of one law
enforcement official upon fellow officers in bringing
a case to a successful conclusion, laws which allow
him to circumvent at will individual officials or
whole departments, laws which repose ultimate
power and ultimate responsibility in several
rather than one law enforcement official, all these
render a law enforcement body potentially a more
effective instrument for the contest against or-
ganized crime and political corruption. Admittedly,
such laws would run counter to deeply ingrained
principles of efficient management. The centraliza-
tion of power and responsibility and the distribu-
tion of functions among discrete subordinate
departments so coveted by administrators is
profaned by such a proposal. And yet, the fact of
political corruption is so pervasive and so pervert-
ing that efficiency and success actually may be
promoted by overlapping responsibilities, over-
lapping powers and overlapping purpose.
Illustrative of the principle involved are two
specific tools which could have the effect of mul-
tiplying the power which a handful of honest,
dedicated men can wield against organization
activity. One of these provides a method of avoid-
ing information leaks when search and arrest
warrants are secured. It would authorize law
enforcement officers of one county to procure these
warrants in adjoining counties and then return to
their own county to conduct the search or make
the arrest.1 2 The second tool cuts to the bone the
412 Such a system was proposed by the ABA com-
amount of evidence which must be adduced to
establish violations of certain gambling provisions.
For instance, some states have made ownership
of a federal gambling stamp prima facie evidence
of a violation of the state gambling laws.413 This
means that a diligent prosecutor could virtually
single-handedly gather and process all the evidence
necessary to a gambling conviction. He would not
have to rely upon the honesty of the police force
to detect and properly investigate the gambling
activity. The prosecutor would not have to trust a
judge and his staff to keep silent about arrest and
search warrants. He would merely visit the local
internal revenue office, obtain properly identified
copies of the pertinent documents, and commence
the prosecution. Of course, the federal gambling
stamp is not conclusive evidence, and a judge or
jury could find the defendant not guilty despite
his ownership of such a stamp. However, accord-
ing to the terms of the statutes to which reference
is made, such evidence is sufficient, in and of itself,
to convict. Although the prosecutor probably
would deem it advisable to obtain corroborating
evidence, these statutes place him many steps
ahead on the path to securing a conviction. His
reliance on other individuals and other elements
mittee on organized crime. See, ABA REPORT ON
ORGANIZED CR AND LAW ENFORCEENT (1952).
Under most existing statutes, search warrants must
be obtained from a judicial officer who presides within
the geographic area where the search is to take place.
See, e.g., DEERING'S CAur. CoDEs ANN. (Penal) §1528;
MCKINNEY'S CONSOL. LAws, CODE Or CP.Ir. PRoc.
§796; ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 38, §§691, 692, 693; FLA.
STAT. ANN. §933.01.
In Robinson v. State, 124 So. 2d 714 (Fla. App.
1961), modified on other grnus, 132 So. 2d 156, cert.
denied, 132 So. 2d 159, an ambiguity in the Florida
statute was resolved with a holding that a Justice of
the Peace of one district within a county could not
issue a warrant for a search to be conducted of a home
in another district in the same county.
413 Certain states have attempted to create by statute
a presumption of violation of state law from con-
formance with the Federal Gambling Tax Acts. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. §849.015 (1955). The Florida statute
was held unconstitutional, Boynton v. State, 75 So. 2d
211 (Fla. 1954), but a virtually identical Alabama
statute was upheld, Griggs v. State, 73 So. 2d 382
(Ct. App., Ala.; 1954); cf., Long v. State, 105 So. 2d
136 (Ct. App. Ala. 1958). In any case, federal records
of conformance with the federal gambling tax are
admissible in state prosecutions. Irvine v. People, 347
U.S. 128 (1954). Cf., Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S.
419 (1955); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22
(1953). One municipality even passed an ordinance
imposing a criminal penalty on anyone possessing a
federal gambling stamp within the city limits. Ord. N.
4030, City of Chattanooga, Tenn. This ordinance was
held constitutional and otherwise proper in Deitch v.
City of Chattanooga, 258 S.W.2d 776 (Tenn. 1953).
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of the law enforcement system, who might be
corrupt, is reduced proportionately.
Any legislation which allows a dedicated law
enforcement officer, at his option, to circumvent
certain individuals within the law enforcement
structure serves to enhance the power which that
official can bring to bear against a criminal
organization. Similarly, any law which lessens the
dependence of an individual law enforcement
officer upon other individuals or levels of law
enforcement, in prosecuting activities in which
organized crime is engaged, probably drastically
reduces the market value of corruption.
V. ImPLEmENTATION OF AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAM
AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME
The main purpose of this article has been to
survey some of the more important legal counter-
measures useable in the containment of organized
crime. This survey is now complete. As has been
stressed repeatedly, none of these countermeasures
is a pancea. However, it is believed that the entire
set can form the nucleus of an effective program.
Remaining to be discussed are certain considera-
tions which underlie any attempt to implement
such a program.
The first and most frequently argued of these
considerations is in reality a false issue. It arises
because of the position urged by many that instead
of developing and invoking effective sanctions
against gambling and similar specialties of or-
ganized crime, criminal organizations can better be
destroyed through the legalization of these activ-
ities. Gambling, prostitution, and like ventures of
criminal organizations serve deep and abiding
needs of substantial sectors of the population, runs
the argument, yet the satisfaction of these needs
is rendered illegal in most states. However, the
illegality of these activities is no longer supported
by the moral code to which most Americans sub-
scribe. The argument concludes with the assertion
that organized crime exists because the satisfaction
of these needs is illegal, and it would evaporate if
only we would be more "realistic" and legalize
gambling and similar products and services.
Whether and to what extent gambling or any
other activity should be legal is a concern for
social scientists, voters, and legislatures of the
respective states. In most states gambling, for
instance, is legal in certain circumstances; it may
be that it could be granted a broader stamp of
legality without transgressing against present day
morality or infringing seriously upon other values.
But as a method of coping with organized crime
the broader legalization of activities such as
gambling is merely an illusion. This is because
organized crime is not engaged in gambling as such,
or prostitution as such; rather it specializes in
illegal activity regardless of type. When prohibi-
tion was abandoned, organized crime merely
shifted its primary emphasis from bootleg whiskey
to gambling. If gambling were legalized, criminal
organizations would concentrate their efforts in
new fields of endeavor, whether those be areas
already invaded, such as shylocking, racketeering,
and narcotics, or relatively new areas, like robbery,
fencing, or securities fraud. Any species of criminal
enterprise which can be more successfully con-
ducted on an organized, long-term basis than by
individuals or ad hoc groups is a field ripe for
organized crime. Today it derives a major propor-
tion of its income from gambling because gambling
is eminently suited to large-scale systematic opera-
tion and poses minimal risks to a well-run criminal
machine. But a well-heeled and well-run criminal
organization could shift on a season's notice to the
cultivation of other weaknesses and the reaping of
added riches from those weaknesses. The factors
which have made organized crime pre-eminent in
illegal gambling will serve to insure its dominance
in other fields of concentration. The insulation
which protects the organization leadership, the
patchwork pattern of law enforcement jurisdiction
which fragments its opposition, the terror it in-
stills in potential witnesses, all these remain.
Police, prosecutors, or judges who have been paid
to overlook gambling infractions can be trained as
well to ignore the new offenses which make up the
chosen successor to gambling as the prime source
of organization revenue. With the sources of its
strength intact, organized crime would stand
unmoved by the sudden legalization of gambling, or
narcotics, or any other activity which comprises
a substantial source of current revenue. Accord-
ingly, whatever else might be accomplished by
such legalization, the weakening or demise of
organized crime is not a forseeable result.
The most significant threat implicit in legal
prohibition of an activity which, like gambling,
is commercially profitable is not the widespread
infractions of the law it may generate, but rather
the powerful criminal organizations it will spawn
and feed. Consequently, the creation of special
sanctions focused on this specific prime danger
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appears to be in order. Penalties and legal weapons
which would be considered grossly excessive by
most persons if employed against a casual violator
or a small-time operator may well constitute bare
minimums in checking the growth of a major
criminal organization. Thus, what would be a
misdemeanor and punishable by fine or short
imprisonment if the convicted defendant were a
better or part-time "bookie," should properly be a
felony punishable by several years in prison if the
defendant is a member of a large-scale criminal
organization. Further, techniques such as com-
pulsory reports to the police, immunity, and
wiretapping are not helpful or desirable in en-
forcing the policy against gambling with regard to
the casual better or non-syndicate gambler. Yet
those same techniques may be indispensible to
effective treatment of the criminal organizations
taking part in the same activities. These considera-
tions suggest that, in the preparation of a program
for the containment of organized crime such as has
been discussed in this article, it may be wise to
discriminate between criminal organizations and
others committing violations of the same laws.
Such discrimination would be advisable both
because it might make such a program more
palatable to legislators and because it would tend
to encourage a broader base of public support
during the actual implementation of the program.
Separation of organized criminals from others
engaged in similar conduct is a considerable task.
It implies the creation of refined statutes which
will dissociate small-time practitioners from the
vast criminal cartels. Although difficult, this does
not appear impossible. Organized crime has at
least two critical dimensions which tend to dis-
tinguish it from other criminal entities and which
would prove useful in formulating a workable
statutory distinction. The first is the size of the
criminal organization itself. It might be feasible to
define a criminal organization as any group en-
gaged in criminal activity which is larger than a
certain stated minimum membership. Thus, if
law enforcement officials had reason to believe
that a given operation were being conducted by a
group larger than the stated minimum, the special
procedural and evidence-gathering techniques
would be available. And, if the prosecution could
establish at trial that this in fact was the case,
the heavier penalties would apply. Of course, the
minimum membership required to trigger the
special treatment to be accorded organized crime
necessarily would be set at different levels for
different sized communities. A number which
would comprise a substantial criminal organiza-
tion in a medium-sized city such as Kansas
City or Cincinnati might not qualify as more than
an insignificant group in New York City or
Chicago. Therefore, considerable study would be
required before establishing the applicable cut-off
in any particular state or locality. Furthermore,
the legislature should be constantly sensitive to
changing conditions which might require an
adjustment in the figure.
Unfortunately, this criterion for discriminating
between organized crime and average criminals
has at least one serious drawback. That is the
tremendous burden it would foist upon the govern-
ment as a condition for invoking the special
techniques and sanctions. Although the total
membership of a criminal organization is large,
each of its outlets and operations ordinarily will
employ a relatively slight proportion of the total
membership. Accordingly, in order to establish a
worthwhile case, law enforcement personnel would
be forced to establish the connection between
persons engaged in similar activity at a whole
series of outwardly separate and distinct establish-
ments.
Organized crime has another dimension, how-
ever, which might offer a more suitable basis for
drawing the line between it and other criminal
groups. That dimension is the scale of its opera-
tions. The individual criminal or small group
ordinarily can conduct operations which gross
only a limited amount. Either through founding
large separate establishments or a long circuit of
small establishments, criminal organizations derive
vastly larger sums from the same lines of endeavor.
Capitalizing upon this salient factor, a legislature
could enact legislation which would render sus-
ceptible to special treatment any operation or
series of operations which according to an ap-
propriate standard of measurement exceeds a
certain size. New York State recently passed a
statute embodying this basic principle. By the
terms of this legislation, gambling offenses are
only misdemeanors unless the state can establish
that the accused accepted more than a certain
minimum number of bets per day. In the latter
instance, the accused stands convicted of a
felony. 4 Expanding this concept to embrace not
414 "Any person engaged in bookmaking to the
extent that he receives or accepts in any one day more
than five bets or wagers... which bets or wagers shall
be of such size that the total of the amounts of money
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only gambling but all the nefarious enterprises of
organized crime, and allowing the size of the
operation to influence not only the ultimate sanc-
tions imposed but the procedural and investiga-
tive techniques available, would mark a significant
step forward in making the law enforcement
response to organized crime as potent and as
sophisticated as the threat itself.
As it is hoped this article has revealed, the
vital consideration in the containment of organized
crime is not what activities are rendered legal or
illegal, but that with regard to those which are
illegal, a system of sanctions be provided sufficient
to preclude criminal organizations from waxing
rich and powerful through exploitation of the
prohibited fields. If the prohibited activity is
capable of extensive commercial development
through careful preparation and sound organiza-
tion, it is ripe for organized crime, and a thorough
program of effective sanctions is imperative.
Gambling is the prime current example of such an
activity. If certain forms of gambling are to be
paid or promised to be paid to such bookmaker on
account thereof shall exceed five thousand dollars, shall
be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for a
term not exceeding five years." McKIN Y's CONSOL.
LAWS, N.Y. PENAL CODE §986-c. See also, McKm-
NEY's CONSOL. LAWS, N.Y. PENAL CoDE §974-a,
which applies the same princinle to large scale lottery
operators.
illegal, then society should provide law enforce-
ment bodies with a set of weapons, at least as
complete as that discussed in this article, which will
enable them to deny organized crime the means of
founding vast empires on the profits from gambling
enterprises.
Unfortunately, the ambivalence which people
feel toward the morality of gambling too often is
reflected in laws which render gambling illegal
but impose "slap-on-the-hand" penalties for in-
fractions of those laws. This dubious compromise
creates an unhealthy vacuum: legitimate business-
men will not provide the illegal service out of
respect for the law proscribing the activity. But
the sanctions established are insufficient to dis-
courage criminal organizations from filling the
void and prospering thereby. With that prosperity
comes economic and political power. The con-
centration of such power in the hands of any small
group poses a potential danger to a democratic
society. But when it is held by a group with no
respect for society, a group which makes a pro-
fession of breaking law and bending order, the
danger is immediate, it is real, and it is perpetual.
It is time this nation and its citizens broke the
moral deadlock which unleashes powerful criminal
organizations in our midst, while binding law
enforcement to a nineteenth century pillar of
ineffectual laws and antiquated procedures.
